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PRIVACY AT 50: THE BEDROOM, THE COURTROOM, AND THE 
SPACES IN BETWEEN 
JUDITH A. BAER∗ 
Fifty years have passed since the Supreme Court found a right of pri-
vacy in the Constitution.  Whether Griswold v. Connecticut1 recognized or 
invented this right is a question that resists resolution.  Griswold was a rul-
ing whose doctrine had more impact than its immediate result.  The Con-
necticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives was “uncommonly silly,” 
“obviously unenforceable,” and unique.2  The only law in the United States 
anywhere near as restrictive was Massachusetts’s prohibition of the sale and 
distribution.  Birth control was not a controversial issue—the Pill had been 
available for five years—which may be one reason why the ruling got little 
critical scrutiny.  Within ten years, the right itself grew from a marital right 
to an individual right (there went the Massachusetts law) to a right to abor-
tion.3  The first ruling raised few, if any, eyebrows.  The second provoked a 
firestorm that has raged ever since.  The judicial response to this controver-
sy has veered between retreat and advance. 
Bowers v. Hardwick4 found no privacy issue in a law criminalizing 
homosexual activity.  Instead, the majority refused to recognize what it 
called “a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.”5  Lawrence 
v. Texas6 proclaimed Bowers “not correct when it was decided, [and] not 
correct today.”7  No such reversal has occurred in the Justices’ approaches 
to abortion rights.  The trend has been consistently negative, as successive 
Republican presidents have selected anti-choice Justices.  The Court did not 
reverse Roe v. Wade,8 as predicted, but Planned Parenthood v. Casey9 de-
moted abortion from a right to a semi-right.  Since 1992, restrictions on 
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 1.  381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
 2.  Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 3.  The Massachusetts case was Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).  The abortion case 
was Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 4.  478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 5.  Id. at 191. 
 6.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 7.  Id. at 578; see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (invalidating the 
Defense of Marriage Act).  Here, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion stressed both indi-
vidual rights and state powers. 
 8.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 9.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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abortion do not need compelling justification; they need only avoid impos-
ing an “undue burden.”10  Rulings since Casey have endorsed governmental 
powers to restrict access to abortion.11 
In June 2015, Obergefell v. Hodges12 ruled that same-sex marriage is 
legal and all existing same-sex marriages are valid throughout the United 
States.  “[T]he right to marry,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the ma-
jority, “is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and un-
der the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and 
that liberty.”13 
This ruling, while less polarizing than Roe, is controversial both out-
side and within the Court; all four dissenters wrote opinions.  Depending on 
the future composition of the Court, Obergefell may either reinforce the 
right of privacy or invite rulings that do to Griswold what West Coast Hotel 
v. Parrish14 did to Lochner v. New York.15 
I differ from most political scientists, and many legal scholars, in as-
serting that both Griswold and Roe were rightly decided.  The flaws in the 
reasoning of both cases, which have been pointed out at too much length by 
too many authors to require repetition, do not vitiate the argument for infer-
ring a constitutional right of privacy.  (And why is it that students of consti-
tutional law speak of inferred rights but implied powers?)  As far as I am 
concerned, the legitimacy of the right to privacy is no longer an issue.  This 
Paper has two purposes.  First, I inquire what is distinctive and defensible 
about the privacy right established in Griswold, extended in Roe, and af-
firmed in Lawrence.  Second, I explore the implications of this freedom for 
another core constitutional value: equality. 
I.  PRIVACY, AUTONOMY, AND ASSOCIATION 
The easiest criticism to make about Griswold and Roe is that they are 
just as bad as Lochner: they limit legislative power by entrenching a right 
not specified in the Constitution.16  The easiest refutation of that criticism 
points out the differences between those who benefitted from Lochner and 
those who benefitted from Griswold.  In 1905, the real victors were em-
                                                          
 10.  Id. at 874; see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 11.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).  Restrictions that have been sus-
tained include waiting periods, reporting requirements, mandatory counseling, and limitations on 
where and by whom abortions may be performed.   
 12.  135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 13.  Id. at 2604. 
 14.  300 U.S. 379 (1937).  
 15.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 16.  See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 
YALE L.J. 920 (1973). 
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ployers who could set employees’ working hours without government inter-
ference.  In 1965, the victors were women who could not afford private 
medical care; they got freedom that everyone else in Connecticut already 
had.17  But the similarities between the decisions are greater than twenty-
first-century liberals might like to admit.  In neither case does the majority 
opinion pertain to the actual controversy.  Justice Rufus Peckham waxed 
eloquent about the right of “grown and intelligent men” to “labor to earn 
their living,” but Lochner protected the power of an employer to set work-
ing hours.18  Justice William O. Douglas’s rhetorical question—“Would we 
permit the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for tell-
tale signs of the use of contraceptives?”—accompanied a ruling that upheld 
the right of the Planned Parenthood Association to establish a clinic and 
dispense contraceptives.19 
Analysis of the Griswold opinion reveals yet another similarity with 
Lochner.  Douglas cited several constitutional provisions to support his 
conclusion that a “penumbra” surrounding the Bill of Rights established a 
right of privacy.20  These included “[t]he right of association contained in 
the penumbra of the First Amendment,” the Third Amendment’s prohibi-
tion of quartering soldiers in homes in peacetime, the Search and Seizures 
Clause of the Fourth Amendment, the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment’s reference to unenumerated 
rights.21  The use of the Ninth Amendment by Justice Douglas and Justice 
Arthur Goldberg was exciting, but it went nowhere.  The two dissenters, 
Justice Hugo Black and Justice Potter Stewart, insisted that its purpose was 
to reserve power to the people within the states.22  They continued the tradi-
tion established in Barron v. Baltimore23 of reading rights phrased in the 
passive voice as limiting only the federal government.  Justice Goldberg did 
not stay on the Court long enough to continue making the argument.24  Jus-
tice Douglas’s opinion does little more than list the remaining rights.  Aside 
from his concept of “penumbra,” he does not attempt to integrate them into 
a whole, to ask, “What may these rights, read together, mean?” 
                                                          
 17.  Mark A. Graber makes a similar argument about Roe: that legalization made abortion 
available for women who could not previously afford it.  But even for the affluent, getting an ille-
gal abortion was difficult and expensive.  MARK A GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL 
CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS (1996).  
 18.  Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61. 
 19.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).  
 20.  Id. at 484. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Respectively, id. at 518–20 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 529–30 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 23.  32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
 24.  Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487–91 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).  Goldberg resigned from the 
Court in the summer of 1965 to become ambassador to the United Nations. 
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The differences among the rights are as obvious as the similarities.  
The Third and Fourth Amendment provisions are rights to seclusion: the 
immunity from self-incrimination, a right to secrecy.  The privacy rights 
differ in kind from both of these.  Griswold protected a right of association 
(within marriage).  Roe, Casey, and Lawrence endorsed rights to autonomy.  
Griswold was not the first occasion that the Court had protected such a 
right.  The decision’s doctrinal ancestors, cited therein, were NAACP v. Al-
abama,25 which invalidated on First Amendment grounds a requirement 
that organizations turn their membership lists over to the state on request, 
and two decisions26 from the 1920s written by, of all people, Justice James 
McReynolds.27 
Calling NAACP v. Alabama a privacy case is more confusing than en-
lightening; the right involved was a right of public association. Meyer v. 
Nebraska struck down restrictions on the teaching in, and of, foreign lan-
guages in public schools.28  Pierce v. Society of Sisters negated an initiative 
making public school attendance compulsory, on the grounds that it violat-
ed the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and educa-
tion of children under their control.”29  (The concrete result of this decision 
was, in fact, to protect the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary 
from state interference with their school system).  The Court decided these 
cases on substantive due process grounds.  Lochner lived. 
Why, then, do I defend constitutional privacy rights?  Despite Gris-
wold’s failure, they can be based on a holistic and integrated interpretation 
of the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clauses, or both—even without the 
Ninth Amendment.30  The distance between listing “zones of privacy” and 
identifying a “zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional 
guarantees” is a logical step, not a leap, a vault, or, in John Hart Ely’s met-
aphor, a slalom.31  Seclusion, secrecy, and association combine to endorse 
private autonomy.  This combination could not cover Roe, since abortion, at 
that time, did not take place in private.  But strong arguments have since 
                                                          
 25.  357 U.S. 449 (1958).  
 26. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925). 
 27.  James Clark McReynolds, appointed by Woodrow Wilson, served from 1914 to 1941.  
He consistently voted for business interests and against progressive legislation.  Along with Willis 
Van Devanter, George Sutherland, and Pierce Butler, he was one of the “Four Horseman” whose 
hostility to New Deal programs provoked Franklin Roosevelt’s plan to increase the size of the 
Court. 
 28.  262 U.S. at 400. 
 29.  268 U.S. at 534–35. 
 30.  See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW (1969). 
 31.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 66 (1980). 
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been made for locating this privacy right in the Thirteenth32 or Fourteenth33 
Amendment.  None of these arguments will satisfy those who agree with 
Robert Bork that constitutional rights must be construed narrowly,34 but the 
judicial tradition of construing powers broadly militates against defending 
that position. 
Roe v. Wade exposed the defects of Griswold.  The majority opinion 
and separate concurrences suggest that at least some Justices found the step 
from birth control to abortion easy.35  The fact that seven male jurists as-
sumed without argument in 1973 that the right of men and women to make 
decisions about conception entailed the right of women to make decisions 
about pregnancy was encouraging, but a nuanced, comprehensive discus-
sion of why the similarities between birth control and abortion were more 
important than the differences would have made the ruling less vulnerable.  
Instead, the core of Justice Harry Blackmun’s majority opinion consisted of 
a list, a proclamation, and a non sequitur.  Justice Blackmun added some 
post-1965 rulings, notably Eisenstadt v. Baird and Loving v. Virginia, to 
Justice Douglas’s provisions and precedents.36  “This right of privacy,” Jus-
tice Blackmun continued, “is broad enough to include a woman’s decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”37  Why? Because unwanted 
pregnancy harms pregnant women and their families.  Generations of un-
dergraduates in my courses in civil liberties and women and the law have 
easily grasped the difficulty with the argument: law can force people to do 
or not to do many things that can cause harm.  Few legal scholars defended 
Roe.38 Courts retreated, handling privacy cases timidly. 
Would it have made any difference if the privacy cases had been better 
reasoned?  Certainly not to the anti-choice lobby, or to the editors, authors, 
and subsidizers responsible for the conservative, religious journal, First 
Things.  I doubt that Justice Byron White, whose dissent accused the major-
ity of favoring “the convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother” 
                                                          
 32.  See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor, Revisited: The Thirteenth Amendment and Abor-
tion, in PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT ABOLITIONISM AND ITS 
CONTEMPORARY VITALITY 226–44 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010).   
 33.  Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Equality Arguments for Abortion Rights, 60 UCLA L. 
REV. DISCOURSE 160 (2013). 
 34.  Robert Bork, Tradition and Morality in Constitutional Law, 1984 Francis Boyer Lecture 
at AEI Annual Dinner (Dec. 6, 1984), https://www.aei.org/publication/tradition-and-morality-in-
constitutional-law/. 
 35.  JUDITH A. BAER, OUR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW: CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST 
JURISPRUDENCE 125–28 (1999). 
 36.  Respectively, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 37.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 38.  For an exception, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 
(1990); Laurence H. Tribe, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and 
Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).  
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over “the life or potential life of the fetus,” would have been impressed.39  
The former dean of the law school of Notre Dame wrote, “Mr. Justice 
Blackmun seems unconscious of the fact that women want children.”40  A 
critic who misread so badly—the majority opinion referred consistently to 
unwanted pregnancy—may have based his opposition to the ruling on his 
opposition to the result.  Some critics of Roe should have known better. 
But there were judges like Justice William Rehnquist, whose dissent in 
Roe emphasized not (preferred) result but (due) process.41  And scholars 
like Ely, professor of law at Yale and Harvard and later law school dean at 
Stanford, who labeled Roe “a very bad decision . . . because it is bad consti-
tutional law, or rather because it is not constitutional law and gives no sense 
of an obligation to try to be.”42  Judges read legal scholarship; professors 
teach future judges; and they all meet at conferences.  Suppose solid argu-
ments for privacy rights had influenced the bench, bar, and academy in the 
generation since Roe.  Would the pool of anti-choice candidates now avail-
able for judgeships exist?  Would those members of the attentive public 
who oppose legalized abortion but who consider other issues more im-
portant have put abortion on the back burner? 
A popular argument against Roe (though inapplicable to Griswold or 
Eisenstadt) asserts that it usurped a decision that belonged to the democratic 
process.  My students never make this argument without my teasing it out 
of them, but legal experts and political scientists often do.  Justice Ruth Ba-
der Ginsberg has taken this position repeatedly.  “My criticism of Roe,” she 
said in 2013, “is that it seems to have stopped momentum on the side of 
change.”43  She would have preferred “that abortion rights be secured more 
gradually, in a process that included state legislatures.”44  Lawrence Tribe 
has argued that few if any states were poised to follow New York’s and 
Hawaii’s lead in legalizing abortion before Roe; no momentum existed.45  
Moreover, the “democratic process” is an abstraction; weighed against the 
concrete reality of reluctant pregnancy, it must yield.  I agree with Tribe 
that Roe effectively assigned the abortion decision to pregnant women 
themselves.  This action fits easily within David Easton’s definition of poli-
tics as the authoritative allocation of values for society as a whole.  We 
                                                          
 39.  Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). 
 40.  Joseph O’Meara, Abortion: The Court Decides a Non-Case, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 343 
(1974). 
 41.  Roe, 410 U.S. at 172–78 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 42.  Ely, supra note 16, at 947. 
 43. Meredith Heagney, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg Offers Critique of Roe v. Wade During 
a Law School Visit, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS (May 
15, 2013), www.law.uchicago.edu/news/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-offer-critique-roe-v-wade-
during-law-school-visit. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Tribe, supra note 38, at 45–51. 
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know that courts make political decisions, even if they avoid political ques-
tions.  Roe v. Wade may have been bad politics.  In the long run, it may do 
more harm to abortion rights than good.  But it is not wrong. 
II.  PRIVACY AND EQUALITY: CONFLICT?  COOPERATION?  BOTH? 
The relationship and apparent contradiction between privacy and 
equality has been exhaustively treated in constitutional jurisprudence.  
Much of this discourse, to which I have contributed, involves questions of 
gender.46  The connection between public and private is equally present and 
powerful in the relationship between privacy and gender equality.  Justice 
Ginsburg, who successfully argued several significant women’s rights cases 
before the Court, is “troubled that the focus on Roe was on a right to priva-
cy, rather than women’s rights.”47  But in 1973, a decision based on the 
Equal Protection Clause would have been a dramatic departure from prece-
dent.  Feminism was alive and well in the 1970s, but feminist equal protec-
tion doctrine was in its early stages. 
The Court decided Roe a year and a month after it rejected the old rule 
that sex was a valid basis for classification, in a case where then future-
Justice Ginsburg co-authored the brief.48  She wrote the American Civil 
Liberties Union’s amicus brief in Frontiero v. Richardson,49 decided a few 
months after Roe, in which the Court came within one vote of declaring sex 
a suspect classification, like race.  But three years later, the Court, apparent-
ly reluctant to render the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”) su-
perfluous, compromised in Craig v. Boren.50  This “intermediate scrutiny” 
has been the standard for equal protection cases involving gender since 
then, long after the ERA was defeated.  The Court has not moved from this 
position for almost forty years.  Despite Justice Ginsburg’s efforts in United 
States v. Virginia,51 there is little or no indication that it will demand strict 
scrutiny in gender-based equal protection. 
Casey is perfectly symmetrical to Craig.  The 1992 case does to abor-
tion what Craig does to gender-based classifications.  Both types of claims 
are relegated to a status somewhere between an ordinary interest and a first-
tier right or immunity.  Compelling justification is no longer required for 
restricting access to abortion, any more than it is for sex discrimination.  
                                                          
 46.  See BAER, supra note 35, at ch. 3, 6.  
 47.  Heagney, supra note 43. 
 48.  Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see Judith Baer, Advocate on the Court: Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and the Limits of Formal Equality, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE 
COURT DYNAMIC 216–40 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003). 
 49.  411 U.S. 677 (1973).  
 50.  429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 51.  518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
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For all its brave talk about women’s freedom, the Casey plurality opinion 
invites legislatures to limit legal abortion. 
Could an argument for legal abortions be based on women’s rights 
without declaring gender a suspect classification?  A future Supreme Court 
majority could begin with the recognition that this particular privacy claim 
is unique in the sense that it belongs only to women.  An opinion could go 
on to argue that equality between the sexes entails the right to abortion.52  
This hope is not realistic at present, but this scenario is plausible in the long 
run. 
The most durable critiques of privacy doctrine came from radical fem-
inists like Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin.  Whereas Justice 
Douglas referred in Griswold to “the sacred precincts of marital bed-
rooms,”53 MacKinnon wrote, “The right of privacy is a right of men to be 
let alone to oppress one woman at a time.”54  She insisted, “Reproduction is 
sexual, men control sexuality, and the state supports the rights of men as a 
group.  Roe does not contradict this.”55 
I have assigned Roe v. Wade and MacKinnon’s critique of it in my 
courses since they became available.  By now, most students are ho-hum 
about Roe.  Some women’s studies majors—oops, women’s and gender 
studies—enrolled because of my association with the local Planned 
Parenthood Clinic, but it was forced to close in 2013.  Once in a while, a 
woman student declares that abortion is against God’s law (no male student 
has done this so far).  If she says this in class, we can talk about freedom of 
and from religion and the difference between opinion and policy, thus rais-
ing her grade and my evaluation scores.  If she waits for the final, she’s 
toast. 
A former colleague reports that his students love MacKinnon’s work, 
but he taught at the University of Hawaii.  In south central Texas, the land 
of personal responsibility and positive attitudes, only a rare few students 
have that reaction.  Some students laugh out loud.  Some roll their eyes.  An 
occasional male student indignantly denies that he oppresses women or 
even that he masturbates while reading Playboy.56  These students need to 
learn one general and one specific lesson.  First, they need not agree with an 
argument in order to understand it.  Second, MacKinnon is not writing 
about them, or about other people, any more than Karl Marx did.  She is 
writing about a situation: not class struggle, but male dominance.57  Those 
                                                          
 52.  See Siegel & Siegel, supra note 33. 
 53.  381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). 
 54.  CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93–102 (1987).  
 55.  Id. at 97.  
 56.  Id. at 209.  
 57.  See BAER, supra note 35, at 40–67.  
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who are quiet sometimes indicate receptivity to radical feminist ideas in 
written assignments. 
The majority Justices in Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and Casey also 
wrote about a situation.  Although some of them might deny it, they held a 
liberal view of the world.58  “Marriage,” Justice Douglas wrote, “is a com-
ing together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the de-
gree of being sacred,” an “association for as noble a purpose as any in-
volved in our prior decisions.”59  Justice William Brennan endorsed “the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child.”60  The difficulty here is that the 
decision to bear or beget usually entails a partner.  The protected autonomy 
is both personal and associational.  In Roe, the male partner disappears, re-
placed by a doctor (always “he”).  As we have seen, the assumption of 
equality between the parties is uncertain.  The plurality opinion in Casey 
returns to the Eisenstadt theme: “The destiny of the woman must be shaped 
to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her 
place in society.”61 
These judges knew, as lawyers must, that not all relationships fit this 
model: one partner may dominate; unwanted sex may occur.  Marriage may 
be more nearly equal when people choose their own spouses than when 
marriages are arranged, and when wife and husband are approximately the 
same age rather than the Aristotelian ideal of a thirty-seven-year-old hus-
band and an eighteen-year-old wife.62  The relationship is presumed to in-
volve equal partners exercising free will: consenting adults.  Theories need 
not account for all relevant facts. 
MacKinnon rejects the premise of free will, the idea that sexual part-
ners are equals, and the assumption that sex is consensual.  She bases her 
conclusions on her premises, just as the opinion authors did.  She knows as 
well as they do—she graduated from law school, too—that not all relation-
ships fit her model.  Neither the judges nor the radical feminists care 
whether their premise holds for a majority or minority of instances.  A par-
tial test of any theory is what we can learn by suspending disbelief and pro-
ceeding as if it were correct. 
The liberal assumptions can be and have been carried to extremes.  
With respect to abusive relationships, for example, the question “Why 
doesn’t she leave?” has often dominated reactions, leading to the conclusion 
                                                          
 58.  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 59.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
 60.  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added).  
 61.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). 
 62.  ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. VII, at 293 (Betty Radice ed., The Penguin Classics, 
1962) (c. 350 B.C.E.).  
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that the abuse is consensual.  It is not even a century since the domestic re-
lations courts in Canada were praised for an “attitude of Rex pro the ac-
cused, and not Rex vs. the accused.”63  The marital family is a unit, com-
posed of equals.  What the privacy doctrine accomplishes is to remove the 
possibility of an official veto on personal decisions about sex and reproduc-
tion. 
Yet the radicals are on to something:  
 Women who agree on little else share a perception of sex as 
men’s assertion of power over them.  An activist in Operation 
Rescue says, ‘The idea [of abortion] is that a man can use a wom-
an, vacuum her out, and she’s ready to be used again.’  A NOW 
chapter advises feminists, ‘If your husband or lover is anti-choice 
and thinks the government has a right to control women’s bodies, 
then control his access to your body.  ‘Just Say No’ to more sex 
until all women are free to control their own lives and bodies. . . . 
The fact that women can speak this way to one another, and be 
understood, supports MacKinnon’s thesis.64  
(When I told this story at a conference, one woman commented, “Most 
women who said no to sex would get the shit beaten out of them.”) 
No, the right to privacy does not destroy male dominance.  But what 
MacKinnon has shown is the inadequacy of the privacy doctrine as a sup-
port for gender equality, not that privacy and equality are mutually exclu-
sive.  The one line the Supreme Court has consistently drawn is against 
mandatory spousal consent or notification.65  A prospective father who is 
not married to his unborn child’s mother has no say at all.  He cannot legal-
ly veto her abortion, though several have tried.  A woman can get an abor-
tion or birth control without getting permission.  Privacy rights do not help 
a woman who wants to have a baby or does not want to have reprosex.  To 
this extent, MacKinnon is right. 
Two recurring themes in the abortion controversy provide a link to still 
another privacy issue, that of family autonomy.  In Roe v. Wade the Court 
refused to choose between “a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate 
her pregnancy” and “the pregnant woman’s attending physician.”66  And 
consider the assumption of some anti-abortion activists that, other things 
being equal, the woman would choose to have the baby—despite the num-
ber of pregnancies a woman can undergo during her fertile years.67  The 
                                                          
 63.  AMANDA GLASBEEK, FEMINIZED JUSTICE: THE TORONTO WOMEN’S COURT, 1913–
1934, at 41 (2009). 
 64.  See BAER, supra note 35, at 57. 
 65.  Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976); Casey, 505 U.S. at 
887–98. 
 66.  410 U.S. 113, 153, 164 (1973). 
 67.  See BAER, supra note 35, at 138. 
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same hegemony of experts and commitment to life under any circumstances 
pervade this discourse, too. 
The claims recognized in Meyer and Pierce exist within the nuclear 
family, which is both a private association and a public institution.  Parents 
have rights to make decisions for their children.  Wisconsin v. Yoder,68 
which upheld the rights of Amish parents to withdraw their children from 
school early, relied on the Free Exercise Clause, but the majority cited 
Pierce several times.  Only Justice Douglas questioned the assumption that 
the interests of parents and children were identical.69 
Parental autonomy has limits, but a gap exists between law and cus-
tom.  Two well-publicized cases in the 1980s involved children with cancer 
whose parents refused conventional treatment for them.70  The parents of a 
boy with Hodgkin’s Disease won.  The parents of a boy with leukemia lost, 
but defied the court order to take their son back for treatment.  Both boys 
died.71  The chance that either would have survived with alternative treat-
ments was remote, but their chances of dying with conventional treatment 
were substantial.  Outcomes like these may have influenced current law, 
which does not permit parents to withhold lifesaving treatment for their 
children.72  But parents do.  A web search produced headlines like, “Chris-
tian Kids Dying Because Their Parents Refuse Medical Treatment,” 
“Amish Girl with Leukemia, Family Flees U.S. to Avoid Chemotherapy,” 
and “Second Child of Philadelphia Faith-Healing Couple Dies.”73  Parents 
have more autonomy than law gives them.  Privacy doctrine does not re-
structure family power any more than it ends male supremacy. 
The extent of parental autonomy became clear in the recent controver-
sy over MMR immunization.  Personal anecdotes and bad science spread 
the belief that this vaccine causes autism when given to infants and tod-
dlers.  So many parents have refused to get their children immunized that 
herd immunity no longer exists for measles, which can disable or kill chil-
dren too young for the vaccine.  Most states allow some exemptions from 
immunization requirements.  Where the injections are required for admis-
sion to school, parents may homeschool, often with little supervision.  Pub-
lic health yields to private ignorance and illogic.  Is this autonomy run riot?  
In May 2015, the California legislature revisited the issue. 
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I am not arguing here that Griswold, Yoder, or any other decision 
caused these developments.  I suspect that the relationship between doctrine 
and practice is as tenuous as that between obscenity law and the availability 
of explicit material.  But suppose we follow Justice Douglas in Yoder and 
entertain the possibility that parents and children may disagree.  What if a 
minor who was old enough to have an informed opinion wanted to be im-
munized?  Or what if a gravely ill child did not want treatment, or preferred 
orthodox medical treatment to whatever alternatives the parents had cho-
sen?  In either case, a hospital, a health care professional, or another adult 
might seek temporary guardianship, but how would the minor find such a 
next friend?  The child who wants to forgo treatment against parental wish-
es is out of luck.  The child who wants treatment might seek legal emanci-
pation or, where available, “mature minor” status, but then who would take 
care of her during and after treatment?  These situations are hypotheticals, 
but a real case in 2015 had parent and child on the same side. 
Cassandra C., a seventeen-year-old with Hodgkin’s lymphoma, reject-
ed chemotherapy.  “This is my life and my body,” she wrote. “I am a hu-
man—I should be able to decide if I do or don’t want chemotherapy. . . .  I 
care about the quality of my life, not just the quantity.”  Her mother, Jackie 
Fortin, supported her decision.74  The Connecticut Department of Children 
and Family Services (“DCF”) intervened.  Cassandra became a ward of the 
state, undergoing forced treatment. The state supreme court upheld DCF.75  
Adults have the right to refuse treatment. Cassandra gained this right when 
she turned eighteen in September 2015.  Parents are empowered to make 
medical decisions for minor children, with partial exceptions for life-
threatening conditions, abortion, and treatment for sexually transmitted dis-
eases.  But, at least in Connecticut, the exception for life-threatening condi-
tions is total.  The medical establishment wins even when opposed by both 
parent and child.  Parental autonomy rules, except when it doesn’t.  The 
possibility of recovery trumps the risk of death. 
Cassandra wrote, “My mom and I wanted to make sure my diagnosis 
was correct, so we agreed to seek a second opinion.  We wanted to be 100 
percent sure I had cancer.  Apparently, going for the second opinion and 
questioning doctors was considered ‘wasting time’ and ‘not necessary.’”76  
The DCF took the experts’ point of view, accepting the medical reports at 
face value.  Its lawyer told the court that Cassandra and her mother indulged 
in “some magical thinking that, ‘If I closed my eyes to the fact I have this 
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serious illness, then my cancer doesn’t exist.’”77  The question that preoc-
cupied the court was whether Cassandra was mature enough to make the 
decision, but legally she didn’t make it; her mother did.  In conflicts be-
tween parents and children, parents win.  In conflicts between professionals 
and clients, professionals win. 
Hodgkin’s lymphoma is curable—usually, but not always.  Some peo-
ple die of it.  No one knows, immediately after diagnosis, who will recover 
and who will not.  The surgeon-author Atul Gawande describes how “the 
logic and momentum of medical solutions take over”78 the treatment of se-
rious illness.  Many clinicians pursue cures long after treatment has any ef-
fect but to make the patient worse.  Many patients demand this commit-
ment, but, as Cassandra’s case shows, not all.  No one involved in her case 
seems to have taken what Gawande calls an “interpretive” approach, help-
ing her and her mother “determine what they want.”79  Even a remote 
chance of life is preferred to probable death. 
III.  WHITHER PRIVACY? 
Even with these contradictions, equality and privacy are a potent com-
bination.  That is how the Supreme Court decriminalized homosexuality, 
and how the highest courts of the U.S. and Massachusetts legalized same-
sex marriage.80  The Casey plurality wrote that Roe v. Wade and Brown v. 
Board of Education81 “call[ed] the contending sides of a national controver-
sy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in 
the Constitution.”82  Obergefell did the same, for the third time in the lives 
of senior scholars.  Such a ruling is unlikely to engender the national oppo-
sition that Roe did, but it may provoke the regional opposition that Brown 
did.  The right to abortion, however, hangs by a thread.  While claiming to 
preserve it, Casey allowed states to gut it.  The right’s survival depends, as 
it has since the Reagan administration, on which of the two major parties 
prevails in the next election. 
The space between the bedroom and the courtroom is filled with indi-
viduals, relationships, and the balance of power.  Michel Foucault wrote 
that sexuality was “an extremely dense transfer point for relations of power: 
between men and women, young people and old people, parents and off-
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spring, teachers and students, priests and laity, an administration and a pop-
ulation.”83  Law controls only the last pair, and that not completely.  Gov-
ernment lacks the power to deliver freedom to a whole society. 
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